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P
eer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation ener-
gy-management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosum-
er (i.e., an energy consumer who also produces electricity) of the 
network to participate in energy trading with other prosumers and the 
grid. This poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-
making process of the participants’ conflicting interests and motivating pro-
sumers to participate in energy trading and cooperate, if necessary, in 
achieving different energy- management goals. Therefore, such a decision-
making process needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing 
principles that can ensure an efficient operation of the electric power grid. 
Wayes Tushar, Chau Yuen,  
Hamed Mohsenian-Rad, Tapan Saha,  
H. Vincent Poor, and Kristin L. Wood
The potential of game-theoretic approaches 
Transforming Energy 
Networks via Peer-to-Peer 
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This article provides an overview of the use of game-theoretic 
approaches for P2P energy trading as a feasible and effective 
means of energy management. Various game- and auction-theo-
retic approaches are discussed by following a systematic classi-
fication to provide information on the importance of game 
theory for smart energy research. This article also focuses on the 
key features of P2P energy trading and gives an introduction to 
an existing P2P testbed. Furthermore, the article gives specific 
game- and auction-theoretic models that have recently been 
used in P2P energy trading and discusses important findings 
arising from these approaches.
Motivation
In recent years, there has been an urgent pursuit of an alterna-
tive energy system in which energy production, transmission, 
distribution, and consumption can take place in an environmen-
tally sustainable fashion. As a result, the development of smart, 
sustainable, and green solutions is becoming more significant, 
including the widespread deployment of distributed energy 
resources (DERs) at residences [1], the introduction of electric 
vehicles (EVs) [2], and the establishment of various smart ener-
gy services, e.g., demand response management [3], for the 
effective management of energy resources within the electricity 
grid. Consequently, different signal processing techniques, e.g., 
machine learning, artificial intelligence (AI) [4], and game the-
ory [5], have been offered as solutions to consumers. 
An important objective of using these signal processing 
techniques is to promote the use of renewable energy sources 
within the energy grid. For example, machine learning and 
AI have been used extensively to forecast the power generated 
from solar panels and wind turbines [6]. Due to this innovative 
use of signal processing tools as well as extensive rebates from 
local governments, a number of existing systems use DERs 
as the main or subsidiary source of energy. In particular, the 
global market for rooftop solar panels is booming; for instance, 
whereas the global market for rooftop solar panels was nearly 
US$30 billion in 2016, it is expected to grow by 11% over the 
next six years [7]. Meanwhile, the shift toward solar is being 
complemented by an increase in residential energy storage sys-
tem adoptions, whose ability to deliver energy is predicted to 
grow from roughly 95 MW in 2016 to more than 3,700 MW 
by 2025 [7]. 
If properly utilized, these energy sources at the edge of 
the grid can help manage demand more efficiently; however, 
this will only happen if the owners of these power-generating 
assets are fully incorporated into the energy market [7]. To 
this end, a feed-in- tariff (FiT) scheme is a suitable model that 
engages customers to participate in energy trading. In an FiT, 
as shown in Figure 1(a), prosumers with DERs, such as rooftop 
solar panels, sell their excess solar energy only to the grid and 
can buy energy from the grid in case of any energy deficiency. 
However, due to the significant disparity between the buying 
and selling prices per unit of energy, the benefit to prosumers 
for participating in energy trading is not significant enough. 
As a result, some of the FiT techniques have been discontin-
ued [8], making it increasingly important to create new energy 
markets that allow small-scale participants (users) to actively 
trade energy with one another in real time and facilitate a sus-
tainable and reliable balance between the generation and con-
sumption of energy within the community [9].
As such, P2P energy trading is being considered as a poten-
tial tool to promote the use of DERs within the energy grid 
[9]. The main objective of P2P sharing is to break the cen-
tralized infrastructure of the electricity grid by allowing the 
direct communication and supply of energy between various 
prosumers with DERs within the energy system, as shown in 
Figure 1(b). This enables interested consumers to buy renew-
able energy at a cheaper rate from a peer (or neighbor) with 
excess renewable energy (e.g., from rooftop solar), thereby 
reducing those consumers’ dependence on the grid or a cen-
tral supplier [10]. The development of such P2P energy trading 
has the potential to substantially benefit prosumers in terms of 
earning revenues, reducing electricity costs, and lowering their 
dependency on the grid. An example of such P2P technology 
in real energy systems can be found in the recent development 
of the Brooklyn Microgrid Project (BMP) [9].
In energy trading, the direct involvement of the users with 
one another and with the grid makes P2P systems unique 
when compared to existing FiT schemes. The system poses the 
challenge of modeling the decision-making process of each 
participant for the greater benefit of the entire energy network 
while taking into account human factors, e.g., rationality, moti-
vation, and environmental friendliness. Particularly, in set-
tings where there are many users with conflicting interests 
participating, it would be challenging either to integrate such 
conflicting interests when designing the decision-making pro-
cess of each participant or, if necessary, to motivate the users 
to cooperate with reducing costs, maximizing revenues, and 
pursuing renewable energy objectives. Hence, such trading 
needs to be built on signal processing methods that can take 
such a diverse set of constraints into consideration and deliver 
an energy-management solution that ensures the efficient and 
robust operation of heterogeneous and large-scale cyberphysi-
cal systems. In this context, and considering the interactive 
and conflicting nature of energy trading, game theory is a very 
effective tool for modeling the decision-making processes of 
the participants in P2P networks.
Game theory has been used extensively for the design and 
analysis of energy systems; however, due to the purpose and 
framework of P2P energy trading, existing schemes may not 
be suitable in this context. This is because 1) in P2P trading, 
the main objective is to encourage the participants to trade 
energy with one another and, thus, comprise a community of 
energy buyers and sellers without any (or nearly any) direct 
influence from the grid so that the price signal from the cen-
tral power station may not affect the performance of the P2P 
trading the way it influences the scheduling and trading of 
energy in existing systems; and 2) while the energy-trading 
schemes in the smart grid have exploited various pricing 
schemes including real-time and time-of-use pricing, P2P 
trading will necessitate the incorporation of more innovative 
pricing schemes. For example, as an independent  decision 
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maker, a prosumer may intend to sell his or her surplus energy at 
different rates to different buyers within the network, necessi-
tating the development of new pricing schemes. Finally, relax-
ing the presence of centralized management in the trading 
scheme subsequently creates a heightened emphasis on the 
security of energy-trading transactions between the partici-
pants of the P2P network.
In this context, novel and innovative applications of game- 
theoretic approaches will be necessary to design mecha-
nisms for P2P energy trading. This article seeks to achieve 
this goal by
1) presenting an overview of various game- and auction-
theoretic methods by following a systematic classification 
to provide information about the basic understanding and 
Energy Scheduler/Manager
Power Station
Household Prosumers with Rooftop Solar Panels
(a)
Solar Farm Diesel Generator
Wind Farm
Solar Farm
Diesel Generator Wind Farm
Different Energy Sources
Prosumers in a P2P Network
(b)
P2P Within CommunitiesP2P Between Communities
Power Station
FIGURE 1. Renewable energy commodities currently trading in the emerging smart grid and P2P energy-trading schemes. (a) A traditional FiT scheme.  
(b) How a P2P energy-trading network may contribute to alleviate dependency on the main grid. 
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importance of game theory and its extensive use in  smart- 
energy research
2) focusing on basic P2P energy-trading techniques for inte-
grating renewable energy sources into the grid by describ-
ing key features of such trading networks and providing a 
description of an existing testbed that has deployed P2P 
trading for managing energy
3) detailing some specific game- and auction-theoretic mod-
els that have been used for P2P energy trading and sharing 
some key results arising from those approaches, providing 
the reader with an understanding of game theory in the P2P 
energy-trading paradigm and its potential benefits.
This article can be used as a reference by both new and 
experienced researchers in the emerging field of smart grid 
research. Signal processing is part of a much larger smart grid 
context, and, in this article, we examine only the applications 
of various game- and auction-theoretic approaches for man-
aging the trading between different entities within the energy 
network. This article, therefore, seeks to complement existing 
game-theoretic literature in guiding engineers to effectively 
design and manage the substantial energy generated by DERs 
across the overall network without compromising the stability 
of the grid and, thereby, to enable prosumers with conflicting 
interests to actively engage in energy trading with one another. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the pros and cons of game the-
ory in addressing various challenges in energy systems as well 
as its similar application in other sectors.
Game theory for smart energy management
Within the context of energy management in smart grids, the 
applications of game- and auction-theoretic approaches are 
plentiful. On the one hand, noncooperative games have been 
used extensively to schedule energy-related activities and, 
subsequently, to trade surplus energy with buyers to earn reve-
nue. On the other hand, the recent large-scale integration of 
alternative energy sources, e.g., EVs [11], solar arrays [12], 
and wind turbines [13], into the grid has exploited game theory 
to provide regulatory service for energy trading [14] and effi-
cient home energy management [15]. In this section, we dis-
cuss the application of different game- and auction-theoretic 
approaches across EV domains, DERs and their storage 
domains, and service domains. We first provide a brief 
Table 1. The advantages and limitations of using game theory for designing energy-management schemes.
Area Focus Brief Discussion
Energy management 
without P2P
Challenges Designing management schemes based on the large amount of data from smart meters; modeling 
users’ behavior; forecasting users’ demand; forecasting the generation from  renewable energy 
sources; modeling the interaction between the grid and customers; incentive design for increasing 
users’ participation; improving grid stability in response to extensive renewable integration into 
the grid; and accommodation and coordination of EVs in the network.
Advantages of game theory A well-established, mathematically tractable, and proven optimization technique that can easily 
be integrated with other signal processing and data-driven techniques such as machine learning; 
is compatible with Internet of Things (IoT) devices; suitably captures the interactive nature of 
 management problems and includes users’ rational behavior in the modeling; and is applicable 
to any domain of energy networks including EV, residential, industrial, and commercial.
Limitations of game theory The practical deployment of game-theoretic models is limited and difficult to implement when it 
needs to directly involve human subjects in the optimization process. Furthermore, it is heavily 
dependent upon the performance of the communication network, which could potentially limit the 
performance of the process in case of a natural calamity or network congestion.
Similar applications in 
 sectors other than energy
These include financial modeling (allocation of investors’ savings among financial assets); behav-
ioral  science (rationality of human behavior); computer science (testing boundaries of algorithms); 
resource management (water conflicts in a river basin); agriculture (irrigation strategies  followed 
by stakeholders); and communication systems (channel allocation).
Energy management 
in P2P
Challenges These include modeling user behavior; designing pricing schemes that help users to cooperate in 
the P2P network; managing the security and privacy of users; establishing strategy-proof transac-
tions; maintaining trust between users without a centralized authority; reducing reliance upon the 
central grid, either partially or completely; managing network congestion when the number of 
users becomes large; stabilizing the system due to the increased penetration of renewables; and 
incorporating the central power station as a part of the P2P trading.
Advantages of game theory It can model users’ behavior and their interactive trading with one another and easily integrate 
pricing and incentive design as a part of game framework development; potentially establish the 
trust between the users within the network and motivate them to cooperate via its game frame-
work; and be incorporated with other signal processing  techniques, such as fuzzy logic and 
machine learning.
Limitations of game theory The practical deployment of game-theoretic models is limited and difficult to implement when it 
needs to directly involve human subjects in the optimization process. However, there are recent 
applications of game theory (auction game) in pilot P2P projects, such as the BMP.
Similar applications in 
 sectors other than energy
These include banks (online financial transactions); IoT (device discovery and device control); 
health care (P2P help with patients who have chronic conditions); real estate (P2P lending); and 
finance (debt financing).
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 overview of the basic game-theoretic concept and a discussion 
of the different game- and auction-theoretic approaches that 
have been used to design various past energy-management 
schemes in the aforementioned three domains. It is important 
to note that, while the literature on game theory in energy 
management is extensive, only some of the key studies in each 
domain are discussed.
Basic game-theoretic concepts
Game theory is a mathematical and signal processing tool [16] 
that analyzes strategies in competitive situations where the out-
come of a participant’s choice of action depends on the actions 
of other participants. It can be divided into two main branches: 
noncooperative game theory and cooperative game theory.
Noncooperative games
A noncooperative game analyzes the strategic decision-making 
process of a number of independent players that have partially or 
totally conflicting interests in the outcome of a decision- making 
process influenced by their actions. Such games allow players to 
take necessary action, e.g., making optimal decisions, without 
any coordination or communication. Note that the term nonco-
operative does not mean that the players do not cooperate; rather, 
it refers to the fact that any cooperation that may arise in the non-
cooperative game must not be the result of either communication 
or coordination of strategic choices among the players [5]. 
In general, a noncooperative game can be divided into one 
of two categories: static or dynamic.
 ■ Static game: In a static game, the players take action only 
once, either simultaneously or at different times. A static 
game can be defined in its strategic form as { , ,SN n n N!^ h
},Un n N!^ h  where N  is the set of all of the participating 
players in the game and each player n N!  has a strategy 
set Sn  from which it chooses an action s Sn n!  to optimize 
its utility function .Un  The utility that a player n  attains is 
affected by the choices of action S n-  of the players in the 
set .{ }nN =
 ■ Dynamic game: In contrast, players in a dynamic game act 
more than once and have some input regarding the choices 
of other players. In dynamic games, time plays a central 
role in the decision-making process of each player. Dynamic 
games can also be formulated as static games; however, 
there is a need for some additional information, including 
time and information sets, which are usually reflected in the 
utility functions.
For both static and dynamic noncooperative games, the play-
ers make their decisions either in a deterministic manner (pure 
strategies) or in a probabilistic manner (mixed strategies).
The most popular solution concept of the noncoopera-
tive game { , , }USN n n n nN N! !^ ^h h  is the Nash equilibrium. A 
Nash equilibrium is a vector of actions s)  such that U sn $)^ h
( , ), ,U s ns Nnn n 6 !)-  where , .ss sn n= 6 @  Thus, a Nash equilib-
rium refers to a stable state of a noncooperative game in which 
no player n N!  can improve its utility by unilaterally altering 
its action sn  from s*n  when the actions of the other participat-
ing players { }nN =  are fixed at .s* n-  While a Nash equilibrium 
always exists in a noncooperative game with mixed strategies, the 
existence is not guaranteed in a game with pure strategies. Fur-
thermore, a noncooperative game may also have multiple Nash 
equilibria, and, in such cases, it is important to select an efficient 
and desirable Nash equilibrium as the solution of the game.
Cooperative games
In contrast, with cooperative games, the focus is on how one 
can provide incentives to independent decision makers to act 
together as one entity to improve their position in the game. 
Essentially, both Nash bargaining and the coalitional game can 
be considered under the same umbrella of a cooperative game. 
Nash bargaining is the study of terms and conditions under 
which a number of players may agree to form a coalition, 
while coalitional games deal with the formation of coalitions 
[5]. In general, a coalitional game can be expressed by the pair 
,,Nc o^ h  which involves a set of players Nc  that seek to form 
cooperative groups. o  is the value function associated with 
each coalition S Nc3  and is expressed by a real number to 
quantify the value of the respective coalition. The most com-
mon form of a coalitional game is the characteristic form [17] 
in which the value of the coalition is determined by the mem-
bers of that coalition, regardless of how the players in the coali-
tion are structured. A coalitional game can be classified into 
one of three types: a canonical coalitional game, a coalition 
formation game, or a coalitional graph game.
 ■ A canonical coalitional game: This game can be expressed 
with a transferable or nontransferrable utility. In this type, 
the formation of the grand coalition (i.e., the coalition of all 
of the players in the game) is never detrimental to the play-
ers, which pertains to the mathematical property known as 
superadditivity. The main objective of a canonical coalition-
al game is to study the properties and stability of the grand 
coalition, the gains resulting from the coalition, and the dis-
tribution of these gains in a fair manner to the players. The 
most commonly considered solution concept for the coali-
tional game is the core, which is directly related to the sta-
bility of the grand coalition. Essentially, the core is defined 
as the set of revenues x  for which no coalition S Nc1  has 
any incentive to reject the grand coalition for the proposed 
revenue allocation .x
 ■ A coalition formation game: In this game, the network 
structure and the cost of cooperation play a major role. In 
general, a coalition formation game is not superadditive, 
and, although forming a coalition brings gains to its mem-
bers, the gains are limited by the cost associated with a 
coalition formation. As a result, the formation of a grand 
coalition is very rare; therefore, the objective of a static 
coalition formation game is to study the network coalitional 
structure. In a dynamic coalitional game, however, the game 
is subject to environmental changes, including a change in 
the number of players or a variation in network topology. 
Hence, the main objective is to analyze the formation of a 
coalitional structure through players’ interactions and study 
the properties of the structure and its adaptability to envi-
ronmental variations.
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 ■ A coalitional graph game: Communication between play-
ers within a coalition plays a significant role in coalitional 
games. In fact, in some scenarios, the underlying commu-
nication structures between players can have a major 
impact on the utility and other characteristics of the game 
[17]. The coalitional game that deals with the connectivity 
of communications between players is referred to as the 
coalitional graph game [17]. Here, the main objectives 
are to derive low-complexity distributed algorithms for 
players who wish to build a network graph (directed or 
undirected) and to study the properties (e.g., stability and 
efficiency) of the formed network graph.
Energy management in EV domains
EVs are becoming popular as a sustainable transport system, 
not only for their environmentally friendly features, but also 
for their capacities in assisting the energy grid via vehicle-to-
grid (V2G) and grid-to-vehicle technologies. EVs, as inde-
pendent entities, can participate in energy trading in the 
energy network either by coordinating their charging and dis-
charging behavior to provide regulatory service to the grid 
[14] or by direct interaction with other traders within the net-
work to negotiate trading and energy prices [11]. In this con-
text, a brief overview of some game-theoretic approaches that 
have been studied in the literature to model energy trading by 
EVs is provided.
Since the EV market is growing rapidly around the world, 
both the grid and EV owners will benefit if the flexible demand 
of EV charging can be properly managed [18]. This has been 
approached by devising new scheduling techniques for the 
charging and discharging of EVs in [15], [18], and [19], based 
on a noncooperative Nash game. For example, a day-ahead 
EV charging schedule is proposed in [18], which considers the 
impact of electricity prices as well as the possible actions of 
other EVs. The unique Nash equilibrium is determined through 
quadratic programing, and the case studies are demonstrated 
using data from the Danish National Travel Surveys. Price com-
petition between different EV charging stations with renew-
able power generators in [19] demonstrates that the interaction 
between the EV charging stations can be captured via a super-
modular game and has a unique Nash equilibrium. Finally, a 
smart charging and discharging process for multiple EVs is 
designed in [15] to optimize the energy-consumption profile 
of a building. In the noncooperative energy-charging and dis-
charging scheduling game, the players are the EVs and their 
strategies are the battery-charging and discharging schedules, 
with the utility function of each EV considered the negative total 
energy payment to the building. Each EV independently selects 
its best strategy to maximize the utility function, and all of the 
EVs update the building planner with their  energy-charging and 
discharging schedules; the EV owners will have incentives to 
participate in the proposed game.
In recent studies, auction-based game-theoretic approaches, 
also known as auction games [20], have been used for studying 
coordination problems that arise from charging a population of 
EVs, the traded price negotiation between an electricity mar-
ket and different EVs [21], and P2P electricity trading among 
EVs using the newly introduced blockchain methodology [22]. 
For instance, the authors in [20] use a progressive second-price 
auction mechanism to ensure that incentive compatibility holds 
for the auction game, and the efficient bid profile of the auc-
tion game is achieved through the use of the Nash equilibrium. 
In [21], a noncooperative game is formulated between storage 
units of EVs that are trading their stored energy; in the energy 
exchange market, between the storage units and the smart grid 
elements, the traded energy price is determined via an auc-
tion mechanism and allows at least one Nash equilibrium. An 
interesting blockchain-based auction mechanism is developed 
in [22], in which the authors propose a consortium method to 
detail the operation of localized P2P energy trading. The elec-
tricity pricing and the amount of traded energy among the EVs 
are administered by an iterative double-auction mechanism.
Another branch of game theory that has been exploited to 
design EV trading mechanisms is the coalitional game, which 
(as noted previously) is characterized by a set of players and a 
value function that quantifies the worth of a coalition. Exam-
ples of coalitional games in EV energy trading can be found 
in [23] and [24]. In [23], the authors propose a Bayesian coali-
tion negotiation game as a means to perform energy manage-
ment for EVs in the V2G environment. The game is used along 
with learning automata, wherein it is stationed on EVs that are 
assumed to be the players in the game. A Nash equilibrium 
is achieved in the game using convergence theory. In [24], the 
authors argue that leveraging the cooperation among EVs can 
enable grid stimulation of EV users to charge in load valleys 
and discharge in load peaks. As a result, the electricity load 
is well balanced, and the EV users achieve higher profits. The 
authors formulate the EV charging and discharging coopera-
tion in the framework of a coalitional game and, in doing so, 
demonstrate that the EV users are more satisfied with the vehi-
cle’s battery status and their economic returns.
Hierarchical games, e.g., the Stackelberg game, are the most 
popular games used for designing energy-trading mechanisms 
for EVs. For instance, in [11], the authors study a static, non-
cooperative Stackelberg game to facilitate energy trading 
between a smart grid and EV groups, which is then extended 
to a time-varying case that can incorporate and handle slow-
ly changing environments. The energy trading between the 
aggregation of EVs and fast-charging stations is modeled as a 
Stackelberg game to provide regulation reserves to the power 
grid [25]. In this study, EVs, as the followers in the game, can 
obtain a tradeoff between the benefits from energy consump-
tion and reserves provision by choosing their charging and 
reserve strategies. A similar game is designed to capture the 
interaction between EVs and the charging system controller, 
while the game demonstrates a unique and robust optimal 
solution for poor communication channels [26]. A two-stage 
Stackelberg game is studied in [27] to address the problem of 
charging-station pricing and EV charging-station selection, in 
which the charging stations (leaders) announce their prices in 
stage one and the EVs (followers) make their selection of charg-
ing stations in stage two. A unique charging-station selection 
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equilibrium always exists in stage two, and it depends on the 
charging stations’ service capacities and the price difference. 
Similar examples of hierarchical and other games in the EV 
domain can be found in [28]–[31].
Energy management in DERs and storage domains
The widespread adoption of DERs in power systems can play 
a key role in creating a clean, reliable energy system with sub-
stantial environmental benefits. However, because energy 
production from these DERs is highly intermittent, their inte-
gration into the power system poses a significant challenge in 
maintaining the grid’s stability. With suitable energy-storage 
and energy-management techniques, such intermittency can 
be addressed, and the benefits of using DERs can be increased 
significantly. We discuss some of the game-theoretic tech-
niques that have been used for effective energy trading in 
DERs and storage domains.
The deployment of two-way communication enables inter-
action between the supply and demand sides of electricity 
networks and allows users to exploit Nash games to design 
energy-management schemes for DERs. In [32], for example, 
a game-theoretic approach is analyzed to minimize the indi-
vidual energy costs to consumers by scheduling their future 
energy-consumption profiles. An instantaneous load-billing 
scheme is designed to effectively convince consumers to shift 
their time of peak consumption and to fairly charge the con-
sumers for their energy purchases from the grid. With a view 
toward reducing the cost of energy trading within the grid, a 
day-ahead optimization process regulated by an independent 
central unit has been proposed in [33]. The existence of opti-
mal strategies is proven, and, furthermore, the authors present 
a distributed algorithm to be run on the users’ smart meters, 
which provides optimal energy-production and storage strate-
gies while preserving user privacy and minimizing required 
central unit communication.
Auction games have been proposed for trading both storage 
space and renewable energy from DERs [34], [35]. In [34], the 
real-time implementation of a multiagent-based game-theoretic 
reverse auction model for microgrid market operations featur-
ing conventional and renewable DERs is discussed. The pro-
posed methodology was realistically implemented in a smart 
grid system at Florida International University, and the subse-
quent investigation shows that the proposed algorithm and the 
industrial hardware-based infrastructure are suitable for imple-
mentation in the existing electric utility grid. Meanwhile, the 
authors in [35] utilize an auction game to study the solution 
of joint-energy-storage ownership sharing between multiple 
shared facility controllers (SFCs) and those dwelling in a resi-
dential community. The auction process possesses both incen-
tive-compatibility and individual-rationality properties and is 
also capable of enabling the residential units (RUs) to decide the 
fraction of their shared energy storage capacity with the SFCs 
of the community to assist in storing electricity.
Recently, coalitional games have also received attention 
for designing energy-trading mechanisms for users in resi-
dential areas that are equipped with DERs and storage 
devices. For example, in [36], a coalitional game is used to 
study the cooperation between small-scale DERs and energy 
users to enable the direct trading of energy without going 
through retailers. The asymptotic Shapley value is the core 
of the coalitional game so that no small-scale DERs or ener-
gy users have an incentive to abandon the coalition, which 
suggests the stable direct trading of energy for the proposed 
pricing scheme. Furthermore, numerous case studies demon-
strate that the scheme is suitable for practical implementa-
tion. The authors in [37] focus on comprehensive economic 
power transactions of multiple microgrid networks with mul-
tiple agents; they design a three-stage algorithm based on a 
coalitional game strategy and include request, exchange, 
merge-and-split, and cooperative transaction stages. The 
developed algorithm enables microgrids to form coalitions 
where each microgrid can exchange power directly by paying 
a transmission fee. 
Similar to EV domains, hierarchical games also have been 
used extensively for trading mechanisms in DERs and stor-
age domains [1], [38]. (Due to constraints on the total num-
ber of references that can be cited, we are unable to provide 
an overview of all of them.) In [38], a distributed mechanism 
for energy trading among microgrids in a competitive market 
via a  multileader, multifollower Stackelberg game is proposed. 
The game is formulated between different utility companies 
and end users (EUs) to maximize the revenue of each utility 
company and the payoff to each user, wherein the existence 
of a unique Stackelberg equilibrium is proven. The research-
ers also study the impact of a hacker who can manipulate the 
utility company’s price information and discuss a scheme 
based on shared reserve power to improve the grid’s reliabil-
ity and ensure its dependability. A similar type of game in 
[1] is also designed, where the authors propose a three-party 
energy-trading mechanism within a smart grid community; 
in particular, a noncooperative Stackelberg game between the 
residential users and the SFCs is proposed to explore how both 
can benefit from received utility and the total cost reduction, 
respectively, from trading energy with each other and the grid. 
The maximum benefit to the SFCs, in terms of the reduction 
of total costs, is determined by the unique and strategy-proof 
Stackelberg equilibrium. Dynamic games have also been used 
in DERs and storage domains for energy management [39].
Energy management in service domains
Game-theoretic approaches have been exploited to provide 
services to the grid and consumers via the scheduling of ener-
gy-related activities by the users. These services include regu-
latory services, e.g., voltage and frequency regulation, demand 
response regulation, and services related to the sharing of 
resources, such as storage and designing incentives for users. 
In this context, we can explain how Nash, auction, coalition, 
and hierarchical games have been used to provide these ser-
vices to energy users in EVs, DERs, and storage domains.
Nash games have mostly been used for providing demand 
response services to the grid. On the one hand, Nash games are 
sometimes exploited by the users to decide on the  scheduling 
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of their daily energy-related activities to participate in demand 
response [3], [18]. On the other hand, Nash games have also 
been played as a part of another game, such as a hierarchical 
game, to reach the desired solution. For instance, in [1] and [11], 
a Nash game was played by the followers as part of a Stackel-
berg game to reach an equilibrium solution. A Nash game has 
also been utilized in [14] to help develop a smart pricing policy 
and design a mechanism to achieve optimal frequency-regula-
tion performance in a distributed fashion.
Applications of auction games can be found in designing ser-
vices, e.g., storage sharing [35], demand response [21], and fre-
quency regulation [40]. For example, in [40], the authors present 
a bidding behavior model and an auction architecture consisting 
of a central aggregator and networked-microgrid agents. The 
bidding behavioral states the microgrid agents are formalized 
for the belief updates and short-term policy determinations to 
maximize individual profits. A reverse auction model is then 
adopted to enable competitive negotiations between the central 
aggregator and the networked-microgrid agents. The auction 
and aggregation processes are implemented in a power-system 
control area to contribute to frequency control. Furthermore, 
auction games have also been employed by incentivizing users 
to participate in energy management [35].
Coalitional games, including both coalition formation 
games and canonical coalition games, have been effective in 
designing services for the energy sector. Demand response 
regulations in the EV domain have been implemented by 
using a coalition formation game [23]. In [36], the authors 
demonstrate how to incentivize energy users with small-scale 
energy power production units, e.g., rooftop solar panels, to 
directly trade energy with other users within a community 
instead of trading with the retailer. Moreover, the explora-
tion of coalitional games for regulation service [24], wherein 
the authors design a coalition formation game to schedule the 
charging and discharging of EVs within a smart grid network 
so that the grid’s stability is not compromised, has been dis-
cussed extensively.
Hierarchical games have covered nearly all of the aspects 
of service domains, and demand response regulations [1], [38], 
for example, show how hierarchical games, through the use of 
suitable incentives, can influence users to participate in ener-
gy trading. In [29], a hierarchical game is proposed to provide 
frequency regulation under a V2G scenario, i.e., a hierarchical 
Markov game is designed to coordinate the charging process 
of EVs. The Markov game optimizes the regulation capacity 
of the aggregator and, thus, strengthens its ability to bid for 
a more favorable frequency-regulation price (regulation ser-
vice within a hierarchical game is also implemented in [25]). 
Furthermore, the application of a Stackelberg game to decide 
on a price for sharing energy storage devices can be found in 
[35] and [41]. 
As shown in Table 2, the application of game theory in 
energy trading and management is extensive. However, the 
discussion of its application in the field of P2P energy  trading 
Table 2. The importance and extensive use of game theory in smart energy domains.
Type Domain General Focus of the Study
Noncooperative 
Games
Cooperative 
Games
Smart energy 
networks without 
P2P
EV domains It includes the coordinating and scheduling of charging and discharg-
ing EVs for optimizing energy-consumption profiles of buildings; 
reducing the queue size at charging stations; providing a mobile stor-
age capability; peak load reduction; the efficient use of grid energy; 
and incentive design.
[11], [15], [18]–
[22], [25]–[31]
[23], [24]
DERs and storage 
domains 
It includes scheduling household activities and managing energy dis-
patch from storage to reduce the volatility of renewable generation 
and improve the lifetime of storage. Furthermore, designing pricing 
schemes to coordinate the users’ behavior toward efficient use of grid 
energy is studied.
[1], [32], [33],  
[34], [35], [38]
[36], [37]
Service domains It considers managing energy in EVs, DERs, and service domains; 
 provides voltage and frequency regulation to the grid; and performs 
demand response. Furthermore, both static and mobile storage shar-
ing as well as sharing of generated renewable energy with the grid 
are addressed.
[1], [3], [11], [14], 
[18], [21], [25], 
[29], [35], [40], 
[41]
[23], [24], 
[36]
Smart P2P energy 
network
EV domains Energy trading among multiple EVs within the P2P network that 
ensures the security of transactions and protection of privacy is consid-
ered. The objective is to maximize the social welfare of the entire net-
work, keep the trading with the grid at a minimum, and penalize EVs 
that do not abide by the rules.
[22], [44]
DERs and storage 
domains 
Its intent is to design suitable pricing and revenue distribution schemes 
so that peers are interested in trading in P2P markets via a steady 
coalition. Furthermore, the large-scale participation of users and the 
trading mechanism including efficiency and fairness are considered.
[46]–[48] [36]
Service domains It addresses the sharing of energy storage between different peers 
within the P2P network so that it maximizes the benefits to all users. 
The pricing of the auction is determined to ensure all of the participat-
ing entities are happy and have no incentive to leave the trade.
[35], [46], [47] [36]
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is limited, which could be because of the relatively recent 
emergence and exploration of P2P trading frameworks in 
energy domains. 
Game theory for energy  
management in a P2P network
P2P energy networks
In a P2P network, the members, or peers of the network, share 
part of their own resources and information to facilitate certain 
applications. Each peer is both a provider and a receiver of 
resources and can directly communicate with other peers in the 
network without the intervention of any intermediate node 
[42]. This enables the network to be resilient in the face of fail-
ure of one or more peers and continue operating normally. 
Thus, new peers can be added and old ones can be replaced 
without altering the operational structure of the system. P2P 
energy networks, as shown in Figure 1(b), consist of a number 
of energy users, including both consumers and prosumers. 
Prosumers are equipped with small-scale DER units, such as 
rooftop solar panels or small wind turbines. The production of 
energy takes place within each house (or near each house) to 
reduce transmission losses and utilize cogeneration, if possible. 
If a prosumer has surplus energy, he or she can either store this 
energy in his or her storage device or distribute it among other 
peers within the network to avoid waste [42]. This empowers 
the users of the energy network to take control of the produc-
tion and consumption of energy within the community without 
any central control authority (e.g., the grid [35]) and to poten-
tially avoid using complex algorithms and technological equip-
ment to negotiate pricing for the buying and selling of energy 
as well as its storage [42].
A P2P energy network consists of two main components: 
a virtual energy-trading platform and a physical energy net-
work [9]. The virtual energy-trading platform provides the 
technical infrastructure for the local electricity market, and 
it must be based on a secured-information system, e.g.,  the 
blockchain-based architecture of the BMP, through which the 
transfer of all kinds of information takes place. To avoid dis-
crimination, it needs to be implemented so that each peer has 
equal access; for example, the generation, demand, and con-
sumption data of a peer are transferred from its smart meter to 
the virtual layer through a secured communication network. 
Then, buy and sell orders are created in the virtual layer based 
on information obtained from the smart meter, which are then 
sent to the appropriate market mechanism to facilitate energy 
trading. Once the matching of buy and sell orders is complet-
ed between different peers, the payment is carried out, and, 
subsequently, the exchange of energy takes place through the 
physical layer.
On the other hand, the physical energy network is the dis-
tribution grid, which is used for the physical transfer of 
energy among peers. This physical network could be the tra-
ditional distributed-grid network provided and maintained by 
the independent system operator or an additional, separate 
physical microgrid-distribution grid in conjunction with the 
traditional grid, which provides the network peers with the 
flexibility to be physically disconnected from the main grid in 
case of an emergency [9]. Note that the financial transactions 
that are carried out between different peers in the virtual plat-
form have no influence on the physical delivery of electricity; 
rather, the payment can be thought of as the payment from 
the consumers to their producing prosumers within the P2P 
network for feeding the renewable generation into the distribu-
tion grid [9].
Key features of energy networks
An energy network should have seven key features that enable 
successful P2P energy trading [9], [43].
 ■ The market participants: A clear definition of market par-
ticipants as well as the purpose of the P2P energy trading 
must be established, and the form of energy that is traded 
in the market should be specified. P2P energy trading 
necessitates the existence of a sufficient number of market 
participants within the network, and a subgroup of the par-
ticipants needs to have the capacity to produce energy. The 
purpose of P2P energy trading, i.e., increasing the use of 
renewable energy or reducing dependency on the main 
grid, affects the design of pricing schemes and the market 
mechanisms of the trading market. Furthermore, the form 
of energy traded in the market should be defined, i.e., 
whether the energy is traded in the form of electricity, heat, 
or a combination of both.
 ■ The grid connection: For balancing the energy generation 
and consumption within the P2P energy-trading network, it 
is imperative that the connection points of the main grid be 
well-defined. At these connection points, it is possible to 
connect a smart meter to evaluate the performance of the 
P2P energy network, e.g., how much energy savings the 
participants can realize by not buying from the grid. If a 
physical microgrid-distribution network exists between the 
participants, it swiftly decouples itself from the main grid in 
case of an emergency. For island-mode operation, partici-
pants should have enough generation capacity to ensure the 
appropriate level of supply security and resiliency. How-
ever, if the P2P energy trading is only conducted over the 
existing traditional distribution network, such an island-
mode operation is not possible.
 ■ The information system: A high-performing information 
system is the heart of any P2P energy-trading network. 
This is necessary for 1) connecting all of the market partici-
pants for the purpose of energy trading, 2) providing the 
participants with a suitable market platform, 3) providing 
the participants with access to the market, and 4) monitor-
ing the market operation. It is essential that every market 
participant has equal access to the market information 
without any interference. Examples of such information 
systems are blockchain-based smart contracts [22].
 ■ The market operation: The market operation of P2P energy 
trading is facilitated by the information system, which con-
sists of the market’s allocation, payment rules, and a clearly 
defined bidding format. Its main purpose is to provide an 
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efficient energy-trading experience by matching the market 
participants’ sell and buy orders in near real-time granulari-
ty. In market operations, the constraint of energy generation 
influences the thresholds of a maximum and minimum 
allocation of energy. Different market-time horizons can 
exist in the market operation (e.g., to cover various stages 
of the electricity market), and the market operation should 
be able to produce efficient allocations at every stage.
 ■ The pricing mechanism: The objective of a pricing mecha-
nism is to efficiently balance energy supply and demand, 
and it is implemented as a part of the market operation. 
Examples of pricing mechanisms include auctions with an 
individual or uniform clearing price. Pricing mechanisms 
for P2P energy trading have a significant difference com-
pared to that of the traditional energy market. In particular, 
with traditional energy, a large part of energy prices consists 
of taxes and surcharges, whereas in a P2P trading market, 
taxes and surcharges are absent due to the zero marginal 
cost of renewable energy. Regardless, pricing needs to 
reflect the state of energy within the P2P energy network, 
e.g., a higher surplus should lower the price of P2P energy 
trading and vice versa.
 ■ The automatic energy-management system (AEMS): The 
purpose of an AEMS is to secure the supply of energy for a 
market participant while implementing a specific bidding 
strategy. To do so, an AEMS has access to the real-time 
supply and demand information of its market participants, 
and, based on these data, an AEMS forecasts the genera-
tion and consumption profile and develops the bidding 
strategy. The AEMS of a rational user would always buy 
energy on the microgrid market when it falls below its 
maximum price limit. Individual agents’ intelligent bidding 
strategies employ varying prices at different times and are 
expected to be a core components of active P2P energy 
markets in the future.
 ■ The regulation: Regulation is a key feature of P2P energy 
trading, and it determines how these markets fit into the 
current energy policy, i.e., governmental rules decide what 
market design is allowed, how taxes and fees are distribut-
ed, and in which way the market is integrated into the tra-
ditional energy market and energy supply system. As a 
result, governments can either support P2P energy markets 
to accelerate the efficient utilization of renewable energy 
resources and to decrease environmental degeneration by 
regulatory changes, or they can discourage the implemen-
tation of such markets if these result in negative impacts on 
the current traditional energy system.
Brooklyn TransActive P2P project
Now, we focus on an existing pilot project on P2P energy trad-
ing built in Brooklyn, New York. This discussion of a real P2P 
energy network will provide the reader with an idea of how 
P2P energy trading is being envisioned for future energy mar-
kets. Local P2P energy trading, absent any utility involvement, 
is yet to be covered by regulations that decide how such mar-
kets fit into the current energy policy [9]. The choice of the 
BMP for this discussion is motivated by the breadth of the 
project as well as by the successful implementation of trading 
techniques shown in their recent pilot demonstration. The 
BMP consists of a microgrid market in Brooklyn, New York, 
and is run by LO3 Energy. The participants of the BMP are 
located across three distribution grids, including Brooklyn 
Borough Hall, Park Slope, and Bay Ridge. As shown in 
Figure 2, the BMP trading  network consists of physical and vir-
tual layers. In the physical layer, the BMP uses the traditional 
grid to supply physical energy flow; however, it also has a 
physical microgrid network among a limited number of hous-
ing blocks, which is comprised of 10 10#  housing blocks that 
can be decoupled from the main grid in case of an emergency. 
The virtual layer, which is completely separated from the phys-
ical layer, is implemented on top of the existing physical grid 
infrastructure, provides the technical infrastructure for the local 
electricity market, and is based on a Tendermint protocol-
based private blockchain called the TransActive blockchain 
architecture [9]. While each peer must have a blockchain 
account to participate in the P2P energy trading, a meter is 
installed in the house of each peer that communicates with the 
corresponding blockchain account and transfers energy genera-
tion and demand data from the TransActive meter.
The energy trading in the BMP is mostly done automati-
cally by an AEMS and only requires several preferences of its 
market participants. The participants must use a mobile appli-
cation (the BMG app), through which they can choose their 
preferences on the source of energy and price limits for the 
AEMS to conduct the energy trading. An example diagram 
of the mobile application is shown in Figure 3. Although the 
participants can change their preferences at any time, it is 
also possible for the participants to choose and set one prefer-
ence for all future use without any further interaction with the 
mobile application. Once the preferences are submitted by the 
participants, the energy trading between two participants (one 
consumer and one prosumer) takes place following a step-by-
step process [9].
 ■ Step 1: The buy and sell orders of a consumer and a pro-
sumer, respectively, are submitted to the market by their 
AEMSs. Any buy or sell order consists of a quantity and 
a price.
 ■ Step 2: The market mechanism is a closed-order book with 
a time-discrete double auction in 15-min intervals. In the 
double auction, 1) consumers repeatedly bid up to their 
maximum price for their preferred energy sources, 2) 
 prosumers bid the minimum price that they request for sell-
ing their generated energy on the market, 3) the highest 
bidder is allocated first and lower bidders are allocated fol-
lowing a merit-order dispatch, and, finally, 4) the last allo-
cated bid price represents the market-clearing price for that 
particular time slot.
 ■ Step 3: Consumers that cannot undercut the clearing price 
are supplied by other sources.
 ■ Step 4: Financial transactions are carried out between the 
allocated market participants of that particular time slot 
according to predefined payment rules.
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FIGURE 2. The topology of the BMP [9]. 
Pricing and Market Mechanism
Different Types of Sources
Prosumers Within the Microgrid 
Physical Network
Virtual Network
Blockchain-Based Information System
A Block in the Chainiii iii iii N
Preferred daily maximum cost
can be changed using this
toggle.  
A participant can choose
which source of energy
he/she wants to buy.
Willingness to pay
determines what kind of
energy someone
needs to buy.
FIGURE 3. A screenshot of the mobile application used in the BMP. The BMP website: https://www.brooklyn.energy/support. (Image courtesy  
of LO3 Energy.) 
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 ■ Step 5: Local trading is then realized in the virtual layer, 
and the transfer of funds is completed.
 ■ Step 6: In the physical layer, and upon completion of the 
payment transaction, the prosumers feed their renewable 
energy into the distribution grid for the consumers to use. 
Note that prosumers may need to pay a subscription fee to 
the utility grid to use its network for P2P energy trading. 
As we now have some idea of how a P2P energy network 
functions in practice, we detail some specific game-theoretic 
approaches that have been used for P2P energy trading in EV, 
DER and storage, and service domains. For each domain, we 
take a specific approach as an example and then explain, in 
detail, how the relevant game of that particular study is used 
to design the P2P trading scheme. Note that such explanations 
help the reader visualize how they may use such approaches 
to design games between different nodes in P2P networks to 
attain various energy-management objectives. 
P2P energy trading in EV domains
P2P energy trading in EV domains has gained considerable 
attention, and studies are being conducted based on both 
game-theoretic and optimization approaches [22], [44], [45]. In 
this section, however, we focus on the study in [22], where an 
interesting exploration of auction games for P2P energy trad-
ing can be found in the EV domain. This study designs a P2P 
energy-trading technique among EVs in the smart grid via an 
auction game and ensures the security and privacy of the 
transactions by incorporating a consortium blockchain within 
the trading mechanism. Note that, to explore how an auction 
game is used in [22] for P2P energy trading in the EV domain, 
we will focus only on the use of an auction game for P2P trad-
ing and ignore the design of consortium blockchains in this 
discussion. The main objective of all of the EVs within the 
P2P energy network is to maximize the social welfare of the 
participants; the model for this localized P2P energy trading 
consists of three main components.
 ■ EVs: The EVs play different roles in the proposed P2P elec-
tricity trading at charging stations, e.g., charging, discharg-
ing, and idling EVs. Each EV can choose its own role 
according to its current energy state and driving plan.
 ■ Local aggregators: These are the energy brokers that pro-
vide access points for electricity and wireless communica-
tion services for EVs. Each charging EV sends a request 
for electricity demand to the nearest local aggregator. 
Then, the energy broker performs an assessment of local 
electricity demand and announces it to local EVs. In 
response, EVs with surplus electricity submit selling prices 
to the broker, who acts as an auctioneer, carrying out an 
iterative double auction among EVs, matching electricity-
trading pairs.
 ■ Smart meter: Each charging pole is equipped with a smart 
meter that calculates and records the amount of traded 
electricity in real time. The smart meter records are used 
by the charging EVs to pay the discharging EVs.
At each charging station, a local aggregator can commu-
nicate with any local EV to establish a real-time electricity-
trading market and facilitate electricity trading between any 
charging EV and any discharging EV in the network. Each 
charging EV ,CVin  which is connected to a local aggregator ,n  
has a particular energy demand cijn  from the discharging EV 
DV jn  connected to the same local aggregator. Meanwhile, d jin  
is the amount of energy that a discharging EV DV jn  supplies 
to CVin  in the local aggregator n. Due to the charging and dis-
charging of cijn  and ,d jin  the satisfaction and cost function of 
charging and discharging EVs, respectively, are given by [22]
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where h  is the average charging efficiency from discharg-
ing EVs to CVin  and wi  is the charging willingness of CVin  
in (1), and l1  and l2  are cost factors in (2); these satisfaction 
and cost functions refer to the benefits and costs in terms of 
real numbers that each charging and discharging EV can incur 
by participating in P2P energy trading and may vary with the 
changes in the parameters, e.g., energy price, charging willing-
ness, and cost factors according to (1) and (2).
As mentioned previously, the purpose of this P2P trading 
is to maximize the social welfare of its participants. This is 
accomplished with the help of the local aggregator n by inter-
acting with both the charging and discharging EVs to decide 
upon suitable charging and discharging energy vectors (Cn  
and Dn ) for trading. In doing so, as explained in [22], the local 
aggregator n that is working as an energy broker not only 
meets the demands of charging EVs but also maximizes elec-
tricity allocation efficiency. Accordingly, the overall objective 
function of the social welfare problem becomes the difference 
of (1) and (2) for the participating EV. For the social welfare 
maximization problem, it is crucial that the energy broker 
obtains true and complete information from all of the EVs’ 
utility and cost functions. The complete information from 
each EV includes its current energy state, battery capacity, 
and so on; however, this is private information that EVs may 
not be willing to share with the energy broker. To address this 
issue, the designed mechanism must extract hidden informa-
tion from the EVs.
In the context of an auction game, an auction mechanism 
is a part of the noncooperative game and is sufficient to elicit 
the hidden information in a real and competitive energy mar-
ket; therefore, it is used in [22] to facilitate P2P energy trad-
ing among the EVs. A double-auction technique possesses the 
individually rational and weakly budget-balanced properties, 
which confirms that the participating EVs have bid truthfully 
according to privacy information and, at the same time, the 
energy broker does not lose money conducting the auction. 
The auction game in [22] is, therefore, adopted by following an 
iterative step-by-step process.
 ■ Step 1: Each participating charging and discharging EV 
submits its bid price to the auctioneer.
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 ■ Step 2: Based on the received bid price vector of buying 
energy (i.e., bid price vectors from all charging EVs) and 
bid price vector of selling energy (i.e., bid price vectors 
from all discharging EVs), the auctioneer produces an opti-
mal allocation of supply and demand energy vectors by 
following a predefined allocation policy and broadcasts 
them to the participating EVs.
 ■ Step 3: According to the allocated energy vectors received 
from the auctioneer, each EV determines its optimal bid 
price, i.e., the optimal bid price for selling obtained by dis-
charging EVs and the optimal bid price for buying 
obtained by charging EVs.
 ■ Step 4: Each EV submits its optimal bid price to the 
auctioneer.
 ■ Step 5: The auctioneer receives the vectors of optimal bid 
prices from both types of EVs and benchmarks them against 
predefined criteria to determine whether the optimal solu-
tion is achieved.
 ■ Step 6: If the optimal solution is achieved, the auction game 
is completed and no further iteration is needed. Otherwise, 
the process reiterates from Step 2.
In the proposed auction process, the auctioneer monitors 
real-time localized P2P energy trading. When unexpected 
incidents happen (for example, a few EVs may leave suddenly 
from the scheduled trades), the auctioneer may restart the auc-
tion process, and a new energy-trading process is executed. 
However, in such cases, the abruptly disconnected EVs are held 
accountable and are made to pay a penalty for disconnecting. 
As shown in [22], the auction-based approach can obtain an 
efficient energy-allocation solution with optimal consideration 
of the participants’ social welfare in the energy market without 
requiring the participants to completely share private informa-
tion about their satisfaction and cost functions.
P2P energy trading in DER and storage domains
To illustrate the application of a game-theoretic approach for 
P2P energy trading in DER and storage domains, we will 
focus on the study in [36], in which the authors design a coali-
tional game to enable direct energy trading from one peer to 
another in the energy network. To do so, the customers in the 
network are divided into two types: 1) customers who are 
small-scale electricity suppliers and have renewable energy 
facilities (e.g., houses with rooftop solar panels) who can sell 
excess energy to the market for a monetary profit and 2) an 
EU who needs to buy energy to conduct energy-related activi-
ties. The amount of electricity supply and energy demand var-
ies across time and may differ for each entity. While the 
customers can trade their respective energy surpluses in the 
traditional market with retailers, the energy trading in the P2P 
market could be more beneficial for both the EUs and small-
scale electricity suppliers [36]. This is mainly because there is 
a significant difference between the wholesale price pwp  (i.e., 
the selling price per unit of energy) and retail price prp  (i.e., 
the purchase price per unit of energy) in the traditional elec-
tricity market, and .p prp wp2  Hence, the monetary benefit 
that a customer may gain in terms of either obtaining revenue 
or reducing cost is very low. In P2P energy trading, on the 
other hand, the trading price pp2p  is set between the wholesale 
price and the retail price, i.e., .p p pwp p2p rp# #  In [36], such a 
choice of price is beneficial to both the small-scale sellers 
and the EUs.
The coalitional game formed between the small-scale elec-
tricity suppliers and the EUs is a canonical coalitional game 
with transferable utility, and the price pp2p  for P2P energy 
trading is determined by an asymptotic Shapley value [17]. 
The canonical coalition game is formally defined by the pair 
( , )Nc o , where Nc  is the union of the set Ns  of small-scale 
electricity suppliers and the set Nu  of EUs and, as described 
in the “Game Theory for Smart Energy Management” section, 
o  is a real number that refers to the total benefit that all game 
participants realize by forming the coalition. Since the value 
function o  depends on the net surplus and deficient energy of 
the coalition, all coalition participants primarily trade their 
energy among themselves with a price .pp2p  If there is net sur-
plus from the coalition, it is sold in the retail market at a rate 
of pwp  per unit of energy and bought at a price prp  per unit if 
there is net deficiency. Thus, o = ( pwp # net surplus) − ( pwp # 
net deficiency).
To effectively perform P2P energy trading, a coalition 
needs to satisfy three properties.
 ■ Superadditivity: The formation of a grant coalition must be 
beneficial for all participating coalition customers, i.e., it is 
always more beneficial for the small-scale electricity sup-
pliers and the EUs to trade P2P, rather than to trade in the 
traditional market. Thus, both parties are interested in maxi-
mizing the total revenue of the coalition. To accomplish 
this, however, the value function o  needs to be superaddi-
tive [36], which means that the total benefit that a set of 
small-scale electricity suppliers and EUs acquired by form-
ing the grand coalition is at least equal to the total benefit 
that they achieve by trading separately.
 ■ The core: There should be a fair distribution of total revenue 
among all coalition customers. In P2P energy trading, this 
allocation of revenue can be done by suitably adjusting the 
trading price pp2p  so that no subgroup of customers can 
obtain more revenue by deviating from the P2P trade. The 
feasible allocation of this revenue among participants is 
known as the core of a coalition, and, if the core of a coali-
tion is nonempty, no group of users has any incentive to 
leave that coalition. It is shown in [36] that there is a 
 nonempty core for the coalition when .p prp wp2
 ■ Stability: When all of the customers receive their respec-
tive revenues that are at the core, no one wants to leave the 
coalition, which, in turn, makes the coalition stable. All of 
the network customers, therefore, continue to participate in 
P2P energy trading.
The derivation of the fair distribution of revenue is complex 
and could be computationally expensive. There are a number 
of mechanisms that can be used to determine a fair revenue 
distribution, such as Shapley value, nucleolus, and proportional 
fairness. In this study, pp2p  is derived according to the Shap-
ley value. This concept is based on the three key axioms of 
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efficiency, symmetry, and balanced contribution and are mea-
surements of the contributions made by each customer partici-
pating in P2P energy trading. By allocating revenue to each 
customer according to its Shapley value, the revenue of the P2P 
energy trading is divided fairly. This is due to the fact that what 
each customer obtains corresponds to his or her contributions 
to P2P energy trading.
However, as the number of customers within a coalition 
grows, the number of computations required to determine the 
Shapley value of each customer increases prohibitively. Reve-
nue distribution is conducted using an asymptotic Shapley value 
because the derived value lies within the core of the coalition 
game [36]. Consequently, and according to the third property 
mentioned previously, the coalition remains stable even for a 
large number of customers. The proposed P2P energy-trading 
scheme, therefore, is suitable for adoption by an energy network 
consisting of many customers.
The adopted canonical coalition game to design P2P energy 
trading in DERs and storage domains can be summarized in 
the following steps.
 ■ Step 1: Choose or design a system model that is suitable to 
incorporate P2P energy trading.
 ■ Step 2: Design a value function that captures the benefit of 
the coalition and determines whether the value function 
possesses the property of superadditivity.
 ■ Step 3: Investigate the existence of the core in the coali-
tional game.
 ■ Step 4: If the core is nonempty, design a suitable reve-
nue distribution mechanism that lies at the core, result-
ing in stability.
 ■ Step 5: Ensure that the design of a revenue distribution 
technique can accommodate a large number of customers, 
which confirms the practicality of the model’s implementa-
tion [46]–[48].
P2P energy trading in service domains
Finally, we discuss the application of game theory in P2P 
energy trading for service domains. In [35], the authors pro-
pose an interesting integration of an auction game with a 
Stackelberg game to provide demand response services to 
the network users by sharing energy storage devices. In par-
ticular, this research explores the solution of joint-energy-
storage sharing among multiple RUs and shared SFCs 
within a community by enabling the RUs to decide on the 
fraction of their energy-storage capacity that they may share 
with the SFCs of the community to assist them in storing 
electricity, e.g., for fulfilling the demand of various shared 
facilities. To do so, a modified auction game is designed 
that captures the interaction between the SFCs and the RUs 
to determine the allocation of storage spaces shared by the 
RUs. The auction price, on the other hand, is determined by 
a noncooperative Stackelberg game formulated between the 
RUs and the auctioneer.
To design the scheme, as shown in Figure 4, a smart com-
munity is used that consists of a large number of RUs that can 
be individual homes, a large number of homes connected via 
an aggregator, or a number of SFCs that provide energy servic-
es, such as managing elevators, corridor lights, water pumps, 
and heat pumps for the common facilities in the community. 
Each SFC and RU has its own energy-production capacity and 
storage devices. In the P2P network designed in [35], each 
SFC, which has larger energy-generation capacity, may some-
times need larger storage space to store extra generation, and it 
can share storage space with the community residential users 
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FIGURE 4. A demonstration of the system model of P2P energy trading in the service domain. 
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who have relatively small amounts of generation and storage 
capacity. To facilitate this sharing (or leasing) of storage spaces 
between multiple SFCs and RUs, the designed modified auc-
tion process consist of three rules, including determination, 
payment, and allocation rules.
The objective of the determination rule is to determine 
the set of SFCs and RUs that can effectively participate in the 
auction scheme to establish the payment and shared storage 
amount. This is executed in a step-by-step fashion, and the 
number of participating SFCs and RUs is influenced by their 
respective bidding prices, the number of 
storage spaces that the SFCs want to share, 
and the RUs agreed upon to lease, respec-
tively, as well as the Vickrey price. Once 
the number of participating entities is deter-
mined, a payment rule is executed to deter-
mine the auction price.
In a payment rule, the proposed tech-
nique in [35] varies from the Vickrey auction and is named 
the modified auction scheme. In a Vickrey auction, the auc-
tion price for sharing the storage spaces would be the second-
highest reservation price. However, since this second-highest 
price might not be considered beneficial by all RUs partici-
pating in the auction scheme, the auction price would need 
to be increased. On the other hand, if the auction price is set 
to the maximum bidding price, the price could be detrimen-
tal for some of the participating SFCs. To make the auction 
scheme attractive and beneficial for all participating RUs and, 
at the same time, cost-effective for all of the SFCs, a Stack-
elberg game is played by the RUs and the auctioneer, who 
decides the auction price to maximize the average cost sav-
ings to the SFCs and satisfies their need for storage space. The 
RUs choose which storage-space vector they would like to put 
into the market for sharing to maximize their benefits. In the 
Stackelberg game, there is always a unique solution to the 
game; therefore, a unique auction price can be derived, which 
all RUs and SFCs agree upon to be the equilibrium price for 
energy storage sharing between them. Also, at this auction 
price, no participants have an incentive to deviate from the 
auction process.
Once the auction price is established, the allocation of stor-
age spaces from the RUs to the SFCs is conducted based on an 
allocation rule. According to this rule, if the total requirement 
of the SFCs is either greater than or equal to the total the sup-
ply from the RUs, then all of the offered storage spaces are 
shared by the SFCs. However, if the supply is greater than the 
requirement, the participating RUs need to tolerate the burden 
of oversupply, i.e., the monetary loss in cases when the supply 
of storage becomes larger than the total requirement of stor-
age spaces by the SFCs. In [35], two allocation processes are 
considered for the distribution of this burden: proportional and 
equal allocation.
 ■ Proportional allocation: Here, the burden of oversupply 
is shared among the RUs based on their respective reser-
vation prices during the auction process. An RU that 
asked for a higher reservation price will endure a greater 
burden when compared to other units with a lower reser-
vation price. 
 ■ Equal allocation: In an equal allocation, however, the bur-
den is distributed equally among all of the participating 
RUs. The auction process is concluded with the completion 
of this process.
Note that, once an auction process is executed, there is 
always a possibility that the owners of the storage spaces, i.e., 
RUs, might cheat and withhold the amount of storage that they 
agreed to put into the market during the auction. However, 
auction schemes that possess the property of 
incentive compatibility are protected from 
such cheating. An auction process where 
no participant has any motivation to cheat is 
referred to as an incentive-compatible auc-
tion. When the participants of an auction are 
satisfied with the allocation and payment 
that they have received and have no incen-
tive to cheat, the term individual rationality is applicable. It is 
shown in [35] that the Stackelberg game based on payment and 
proportional allocation rules render the proposed modified auc-
tion for P2P trading individually rational. The scheme is further 
extended to a time-varying case, which also possesses all of the 
properties of the static case.
Based on this discussion, the overall exploration of a modi-
fied auction scheme in the proposed storage sharing in the P2P 
trading network can be summarized in four steps. 
 ■ Step 1: The RUs and SFCs that can participate in the pro-
posed auction are identified by following the determina-
tion rule.
 ■ Step 2: The auction price is determined based on a 
Stackelberg game-based payment rule, which determines 
that the derived auction price is unique, and all of the RUs 
and SFCs agree between them on that price for sharing 
energy storage spaces.
 ■ Step 3: The allocation of storage space between the SFCs are 
conducted based on the allocation rule; this burden of over-
supply, however, is distributed among the participating RUs 
using either an equal or proportional allocation scheme.
 ■ Step 4: The proposed auction scheme is shown to be incen-
tive compatible and, thus, removes any incentive for partic-
ipants to cheat during the auction process (this property 
also holds when the auction scheme is extended to a time-
varying case).
From previous discussions in the “Game Theory for Smart 
Energy Management” and “Game Theory for Energy Manage-
ment in P2P Networks” sections, the difference between the 
game-theoretic applications in existing energy-management 
studies and in P2P energy networks is obvious. In existing 
energy management, the focus is not primarily on energy trad-
ing between users; instead, the focus is on cooperation and 
competition between users to achieve an objective, which also 
significantly involves the main grid. Conversely, in a P2P net-
work, the participants also work together to achieve the desired 
objective with minimal (or no) interaction with the grid, as 
shown in Table 2.
An auction process where 
no participant has any 
motivation to cheat is 
referred to as an incentive-
compatible auction. 
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Outcomes of game-theoretic  
applications in a P2P energy network
In the “Game Theory for Energy Management in P2P Net -
works” section, we provided detailed descriptions of very 
specific game-theoretic applications in P2P energy trading by 
discussing three different studies in detail: EV, DER and stor-
age, and service domains. In this section, our main purpose is 
to examine some interesting results from those studies and 
show how P2P trading outperforms some existing approach-
es. On the one hand, these results demonstrate the importance 
of P2P energy-trading schemes in achieving greater cost 
reduction and utility maximization of energy entities within 
the network. On the other hand, these results also show the 
effectiveness of using game theory to enable it to achieve 
those benefits.
EV domains
To demonstrate how game theory can be used to design P2P 
energy trading in EV domains, we discuss an auction game 
[22]. We show how the game-theoretic approach is beneficial 
for both the buyers and sellers of energy within the considered 
P2P network, based on two results from [22] and shown in 
Figure 5. Note that this performance is evaluated based on a 
real data set taken in an urban area of Texas. The latitude of 
the observed area is from 30.256° to 30.276° N, and the longi-
tude is from −97.76° to −97.725° W. The observed area is 
approximately . .2 22 3 88#  km2, including 58 parking lots. 
The battery capacity of the EVs is set to 24 kWh, and the min-
imum and maximum of electricity demand for charging EVs 
is assumed to be 5–10 kWh and 12–18 kWh, respectively. The 
maximum supply of electricity for discharging EVs is consid-
ered to be 10–20 kWh. 
Figure 5 illustrates the performance comparison between 
the proposed P2P model in [22] and a hybrid energy-trading 
model [49], in which energy buyers can trade electricity with 
local energy sellers and with the smart grid. In [22], unlike the 
hybrid model, the focus is on localized P2P electricity trading 
between charging EVs (i.e., energy buyers) and discharging EVs 
(i.e., energy sellers) with 90% electricity transmission efficien-
cy, in contrast to the high-energy transmission losses between 
the smart grid and energy buyers and sellers in a hybrid model 
resulting in a low transmission efficiency of 70%. Figure 5(a) 
shows that, when the sell-out price of the smart grid for energy 
buyers is smaller than that of local discharging EVs, the energy 
buyers obtain greater benefits by following a hybrid energy-
trading model because of the lower average buying price. How-
ever, because of high transmission losses, the average amount 
of transmitted electricity from both energy sellers and the smart 
grid is higher than that of the P2P scheme to meet the same 
requirement. If the sell-out price of the smart grid is too high, 
the energy buyers will buy electricity from local energy sellers 
instead of the smart grid in the hybrid model; thus, they retain 
the same benefits as the P2P scheme. Similar results can also 
be found in Figure 5(b). 
Although the average selling price increases with the 
increased buy-back price given by the smart grid, the avail-
able electricity for energy buyers decreases because of higher 
energy losses during electricity transmission. Therefore, com-
pared with the trading model in [49], the proposed P2P model 
in [22] has lower energy loss and a higher electricity utilization 
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FIGURE 5. An illustration [22] showing how the benefits of energy trading in P2P and hybrid models are influenced in terms of pricing and energy utiliza-
tion. (a) The average buying price and transmitted electricity for EVs and (b) the average selling price and transmitted electricity for EVs. 
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efficiency from the system’s perspective. Reasonable assump-
tions can be made based on the results in Figure 5.
 ■ For both cases in Figure 5(a) and (b), P2P energy trading is 
beneficial in terms of increasing systems’ energy efficien-
cy, which is mainly due to lower transmission loss com-
pared to the hybrid network.
 ■ In Figure 5(a), EVs would be interested in participating in 
P2P trading only when the sell-out price of the smart grid 
is very high because buyers are always motivated to buy 
from a source of energy that offers a lower price per unit 
of energy [1]. Therefore, to effectively establish this type 
of P2P trading scheme in the EV domain, the average buy-
ing price, which is US$0.17/kWh on average in the P2P 
network, must be revised to a lower value to compete with 
the hybrid market. Nevertheless, the proposed P2P scheme 
is still able to attract EVs at periods of peak loads when 
the electricity price is, in general, very high.
 ■ Due to a lower average selling price, EVs may sell within a 
P2P network during times when the price of the hybrid net-
work is also low. However, as the selling price increases in 
the hybrid network, more EVs would become interested in 
selling to the smart grid instead of in the P2P network. 
Therefore, similar to the case in Figure 5(a), the selling 
price in a P2P network should be chosen carefully. One 
example of suitable pricing for P2P networks could be a 
midrate pricing scheme [50].
DER and storage domains
In this section, we demonstrate how the P2P energy-trading 
scheme can be beneficial in terms of earning revenue for both 
the network buyers and sellers. In particular, we discuss some 
results from [36], in which the household load profiles are 
constructed from the individual load profiles of home appli-
ances. Each appliance has different rates of power consump-
tion and a different probability of being activated during each 
hour of the day so that the load profile has various statistical 
characteristics (e.g., means and variances) over time. The 
authors use an appliance load profile, which considers various 
appliances such as a stove, a dishwasher, a refrigerator, and 
lighting. They then scale the load profile so that the average 
daily electricity usage of households is similar to that of 
households in North Carolina.
As for the generation profile of small-scale energy sup-
plies, solar and wind generation data profiles are used. For 
solar-generated electricity, the authors use the hourly elec-
tricity generation data that was measured at Elizabeth City 
State University, North Carolina, in June 2012. The data set 
was obtained from the Cooperative Networks For Renewable 
Resource Measurements website of the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory (NREL) [51]. The generation profile of the 
solar generators is then scaled by assuming that the size of 
the solar panels is 6.45 m2. For electricity generated by wind 
turbines, the Eastern Wind Sources data set is used, which is 
also available at the NREL. The generation profile of the wind 
turbines is scaled by assuming that the capacity of the wind 
turbines is 5 kW.
In Figure 6, we demonstrate two outcomes from [36]. Fig-
ure 6(a) shows the monthly revenue of individual EUs and 
small-scale energy suppliers who participate in P2P energy 
trading. In this figure, it is assumed that all of the energy sup-
pliers have either solar generators or wind turbines and that the 
monthly revenue of energy suppliers and EUs participating in 
P2P trading can reach up to US$80 and US$62, respectively. 
However, as shown in [36], the monthly electricity bill of a 
household without P2P trading reaches as high as US$110, and, 
therefore, each EU can save up to 60% of its monthly electricity 
bill by participating in P2P energy trading. Another phenom-
enon that we observe in Figure 6(a) is that the monthly revenue 
of an energy supplier eventually decreases with an increase in 
the number of suppliers (this is mainly because of the character-
istics of the P2P market as explained in [9]). As the number of 
small-scale energy suppliers increases in the market, the amount 
FIGURE 6. An illustration [36] showing how P2P energy trading may bring benefits to both EUs and small-scale energy suppliers in terms of monetary 
revenue per month. (a) The effect of a number of small-scale energy suppliers on the monthly revenue of various EUs and energy suppliers and (b) the 
effect of a percentage of solar generation on the monthly revenue of various EUs and energy suppliers.
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of available energy for sale increases, leading to a drop in the 
trading price and decreasing the suppliers’ revenue.
Moreover, Figure 6(a) shows how different kinds of generated 
energy may affect the monthly revenue of the suppliers and EUs. 
Such a scenario refers to the case in which participants are able 
to choose the type of generation they would like to use for trad-
ing, as observed in the BMP. We demonstrate in Figure 6(a) that, 
when the number of suppliers is lower than 24, the buyers and 
sellers both prefer solar generation over wind generation because 
of its higher monthly revenue. Similarly, both parties prefer wind 
generation when the number of energy suppliers is larger than 
72. However, if the number of energy suppliers is between 24 
and 72, EUs prefer solar generation, whereas energy suppliers 
prefer wind generation. Therefore, in this case, the mixed usage 
of wind generators and solar generators is advisable.
Figure 6(b) demonstrates the monthly monetary profit of 
EUs and energy suppliers for different percentages of solar 
generators used by energy suppliers. According to this fig-
ure, an optimal percentage of solar generators exists that 
maximizes the total revenue of EUs and energy suppliers. 
For example, when the number of suppliers is 30, the total 
revenue is maximized when 60% of all of the suppliers are 
solar generators. It can also be seen from Figure 6(b) that the 
optimal percentage of solar generators approaches zero as the 
number of energy  suppliers increases, which is supported by 
the findings in  Figure 6(a).
Based on the results in the DER and storage domain, as dis-
cussed previously, we can summarize our insights accordingly.
 ■ Participant cooperation within a P2P energy network is 
always beneficial because it provides a platform for trading 
energy without involving the main 
grid pricing scheme, which is not as 
attractive as the P2P scheme [36]. 
Note that this may also be affected by 
how the pricing scheme is designed.
 ■ When the number of energy suppli-
ers in the market becomes very large, 
the revenue to the energy suppliers 
reduces, subsequently increasing the 
revenue of the P2P energy-trading 
network EUs.
 ■ Depending on the number of energy 
suppliers within the market, the dif-
ferent percentage mixture of solar 
and wind generations would be 
optimal for the energy suppliers to 
maximize their revenue from the 
energy trading.
Service domains
Finally, in this section, we will discuss 
and illustrate some of the findings of a 
game-theoretic approach in the service 
domain, based on [35]. In this study, 
the authors consider a number of RUs 
at different blocks who are interested in 
allowing the SFCs of the community to jointly share their 
energy storage devices and provide demand response services 
in the P2P energy-trading market. When there is a large num-
ber of RUs and SFCs in the system, the reservation and bid-
ding prices will vary significantly. Each RU is assumed to be a 
group between five and 25 households, where each household 
is equipped with a 25-kWh capacity storage device. The 
required electricity storage for each SFC is assumed to be 
within the range of 100–500 kWh. The required storage space 
for sharing could be different if the participants’ usage pat-
terns change, and, since the type of energy storage (and its 
associated costs) used by different RUs can vary significantly, 
the choices of reservation prices to share their storage space 
with the SFCs can fluctuate considerably as well.
Note that, once all of the participating RUs offer their free 
storage space to the auction market, they are distributed accord-
ing to the allocation rule described in the “P2P Energy Trad-
ing in Service Domains” section. Figure 7 investigates how the 
average utility of each RU varies as the total storage amount 
required by the SFCs changes. In this case, the total energy stor-
age requirements of the SFCs are assumed to be 100, 150, 200, 
250, 300, 350, 400, 450, 500, 550, and 600. Generally speak-
ing, the average utility cost for each resident initially increases 
with the increased requirements of the SFCs and eventually 
becomes saturated, resulting in a stable value (Figure 7). This 
is because, as the required amount of storage space increases, 
the RU can share more of its reserved energy storage that it put 
into the market with the SFCs at the determined auction price; 
hence, its utility costs increase. However, each RU has a partic-
ular fixed storage amount that it can put on the market to share, 
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
1,100
α = 0.001 (More Willing to Share)
α = 0.01 (Less Willing to Share)
Supply < DemandSupply > Demand
Required Storage Space by the SFCs
Av
er
ag
e 
Be
ne
fit
 A
ch
ie
ve
d 
by
 th
e 
RU
s
η0.001 > 0 η0.001 > 0 η0.001 = 0
η0.01 > 0 η0.01 = 0 η0.01 = 0
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storage demands of the SFCs within the P2P energy network [35].
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and, consequently, once the shared storage amount reaches its 
maximum, even with an increase in the requirements of the 
SFCs, the RU cannot share more. Therefore, its utility becomes 
stable without any further increment.
Another interesting observation from Figure 7 is that the 
designed P2P storage-sharing scheme favors the RUs with higher 
reluctance parameters more than when the storage  requirements 
of the SFCs are relatively lower, and vice 
versa. Here, the reluctance parameter, which 
is denoted by a  in Figure 7, refers to the 
measured willingness of sharing storage 
for each RU; a lower value of a  indicates a 
higher willingness to share. The variation 
of benefits received from different reluc-
tance parameters is dictated by the burden 
of storage-space oversupply. If reluctance is 
lower, an RU would be interested in putting 
a higher amount of storage into the market to share. However, 
if the total amount of energy storage required by the SFCs is 
lower, it would place a higher burden on the respective RU. 
As a result, the relative utility of the auction is lower. If the 
requirement of the SFCs is higher, the sharing brings signifi-
cant benefits to the RUs, as seen in Figure 7. On the other hand, 
with higher reluctance, RUs tend to share lower amounts of 
storage, which enables them to endure a lower burden in case 
of lower demands from the SFCs; this, consequently, enhances 
the amount of utility received. If the requirement is higher from 
the SFCs, their utility reduces when compared to the RUs with 
lower reluctance parameters.
In Table 3, the average utilities that each RU can receive 
from sharing its storage space with the SFCs by adopting P2P 
trading are shown and compared with the existing equal dis-
tribution (ED), and FiT schemes. Table 3 shows that, as the 
amount of energy storage required by the SFCs increases, the 
average utility achieved per RU also increases for all of the 
cases. Also, in all of the cases studied, the P2P storage-sharing 
scheme shows a considerable performance improvement when 
compared to both ED and FiT schemes. Particularly, an inter-
esting trend of performance improvement can be observed if 
we compare the performance of the proposed scheme with 
the ED and FiT performances for each of the energy storage 
requirements. For instance, the performance of the P2P scheme 
is higher as the requirement for the storage increases from 200 
to 350. However, the improvement is relatively less significant 
as the storage requirement switches from 400 to 450. This is 
because the amount of storage shared by each participating 
RU is influenced by its reluctance parameter, e.g., even if the 
demand of the SFCs could be larger, the RU may choose not 
to share more of its storage spaces if its reluctance is limited. 
The RUs in this study increase their shares of energy stor-
age as the requirement for the SFCs increases, which, in turn, 
produces higher revenue. Once the available 
storage spaces from the RUs reach a satura-
tion point, the increase in demand, i.e., from 
400 to 450, does not affect their shares. As a 
result, their performance improvement is not 
as noticeable as in the previous four cases. 
For all of the cases considered, the auction 
process performs better than the ED scheme 
with an average performance improvement 
of 34.76%, clearly showing the value of the 
proposed methodology. The performance improvement with 
respect to the FiT scheme, which is 34.34% on average, is due 
to the difference between the determined auction price and the 
price per unit of energy.
To this end, and based on the results in this section, several 
key insights can be summarized.
 ■ As shown in Figure 7, if the total required energy storage 
of the SFCs is smaller, RUs with higher reluctance are 
more beneficial, and vice versa. This illustrates the fact that 
even RUs with a high unwillingness to share their storage 
space can benefit the system SFCs if their required storage 
is small.
 ■ For a higher storage requirement, SFCs would receive 
more benefits from having RUs with lower reluctances 
since they would be interested in sharing more to achieve 
higher average utilities.
 ■ Energy storage sharing in the P2P trading market is more 
beneficial for the RUs compared to the sharing done by 
following both ED and FiT schemes.
Conclusions
In this article, we have provided an overview of the potential 
of game-theoretic approaches for energy management in P2P 
networks. First, we have highlighted the extensive use of 
game-theoretic approaches in the smart energy domain and 
divided the discussion into three domains, including EV, DER 
and storage, and service domains. Then, we have expanded 
Table 3. The improvement of the average benefits obtained by the RUs in a P2P sharing scheme in comparison to ED and FiT schemes [35].
Required storage space by SFCs 200 250 300 350 400 450
Average net benefits to RUs for an ED scheme 536.52 581.85 624.52 669.85 715.19 757.85
Average net benefits to RUs for an FiT scheme 537.83 583.16 626.83 673.16 717.50 759.16
Average net benefits to RUs for a P2P scheme 629.82 789.82 944.26 960.09 960.09 960.09
Percentage improvement compared to an ED scheme 17.4 35.74 51.19 43.32 34.24 26.68
Percentage improvement compared to an FiT scheme 17.1 35.43 50.63 42.61 33.81 26.46
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developments of P2P 
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our focus to recent game-theoretic energy-management mod-
els that have been proposed and implemented in P2P energy 
networks. Here, instead of providing an overview, we have 
given a detailed discussion of a specific game-theoretic 
approach in each of the domains of a P2P network. The pur-
pose has been to present how different game-theoretic models 
can be designed to solve energy-trading problems in the P2P 
energy network and what the key criteria or properties are that 
need to be considered during the implementation. Finally, we 
have shown some interesting results from the game-theoretic 
models, and we have discussed and summarized the interpre-
tation of those outcomes for a better understanding of partici-
pants’ behavior in P2P energy management.
Energy-management research for P2P networks is relatively 
new, and, currently, all of the developments of P2P energy-
trading platforms are in a pilot phase. Hence, much work is yet 
to be done before the integration of P2P energy trading into the 
current energy system. In this context, game theory may play a 
significant role in future research endeavors.
 ■ A consumer-centric model: The design of the P2P energy-
trading schemes need to be consumer-centric, i.e., consum-
ers must benefit from participating in P2P energy trading. 
Note that some recent energy-trading models and pilot 
projects have been discontinued as they were not accepted 
by consumers. To avoid this, the users’ interests and bene-
fits must be taken into consideration. One potential way to 
do this is to explore cooperative games to demonstrate that 
users can always benefit from cooperating. For instance, a 
user may choose to be a part of the entire network (i.e., the 
grand coalition in a canonical coalition game) or dynami-
cally change its position to a different small coalition 
(coalition formation game) to come to an agreement with 
other network peers for energy trading.
 ■ The demonstrated benefit to the grid: In most of the cur-
rent P2P energy-trading pilot projects, the physical transfer 
of energy takes place through the distribution network, 
which is set up by the traditional grid [9]. Hence, expecting 
that P2P energy trading will completely exclude the grid 
from any energy-related activities with local consumers 
could be impractical, since trading, itself, is conducted 
using the grid’s assets. One way to address this problem is 
to demonstrate that P2P energy trading is also beneficial 
for the grid and that a grid may also participate in P2P 
energy trading if necessary. This will also help the regula-
tory board to understand the importance of P2P energy 
trading to both the grid and the local users, paving the way 
for this new approach to be approved as a part of the ener-
gy system. The Stackelberg game, where the grid can par-
ticipate either as a leader or a follower depending on the 
context of the model and can interact with other users to 
decide on various energy-trading parameters across differ-
ent times, could be an ideal candidate to model this trading.
 ■ High security and low computational complexity: Due to 
the reduced involvement of a centralized authority in P2P 
trading, the security and privacy of participants is a critical 
issue. In P2P networks, an EU (buyer) does not want to 
reveal his/her identity during a transaction with a seller, 
whereas the seller does not want the buyer to misuse the 
traded energy, e.g., for illegal purposes. Therefore, there is 
a strong need for an energy-trading distribution mechanism 
in P2P networks that does not pose security and privacy 
threats to the sellers and EUs, respectively. The advance-
ment of blockchain technology has solved this problem. A 
blockchain is a continuously growing list of records, called 
blocks, that are linked and secured using cryptography. 
Most of the current pilot projects on P2P energy trading in 
the United States, Europe, and Australia are based on 
blockchain-based information platforms. Hence, how to 
integrate blockchain with game theory is a potential future 
research direction of significant importance. However, 
using blockchains for privacy protection in P2P trading 
may require high computational power; therefore, the inte-
gration of blockchain with game theory needs to consider 
this particular stipulation with care and design trading 
mechanisms that are efficient and have lower computation-
al complexity to provide users with the desired services.
 ■ Energy trading with incomplete information: Incomplete 
information can be defined as a lack of information con-
cerning the real-time demand of prosumers and P2P trad-
ing prices because of a problem in the network, e.g., a 
packet loss in the communication network. Such incom-
plete information can potentially damage the performance 
of the P2P energy-trading technique, creating the need to 
design energy-management solutions that can properly 
handle such scenarios. One promising way to address this 
is to design an energy-trading mechanism for a P2P net-
work with incomplete game information. One example 
is the Bayesian game, where the solution is a Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium. 
 ■ The incorporation of physical laws in the game model: An 
important aspect that governs the power flows and couples 
DERs and aggregators on the physical network is 
Kirchhoff’s laws, which are not properly modeled in most 
studies. The presence of physical laws may greatly compli-
cate energy-trading analysis and has a significant impact on 
how the market should be designed and operated. The idea 
of how to incorporate the impact of Kirchhoff’s laws into 
the game-theoretic model for P2P energy trading needs con-
siderable attention. One solution could be to include a com-
mon constraint between the players of the game (similar to 
what is done in a generalized Nash game) that will be influ-
enced by Kirchhoff’s laws. Regardless, in-depth investiga-
tion is required to decide how to introduce such a common 
coupling constraint.
The potential application of game-theoretic approaches in 
P2P energy trading and their subsequent implications for the 
participating users is significant. The purpose of this article 
has been to put a small drop in that large vessel by showing the 
importance of game theory for such networks by demonstrat-
ing what it is capable of and how it has been used so far, as well 
as to provide the reader with some ideas on how they might 
contribute to this emerging energy domain.
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